Sec. 6.04 of the Texas law addresses the concept of causation regarding criminal responsibility for conduct and its resulting consequences. This law establishes the conditions under which a person can be held criminally responsible for a particular result.

According to the law:

Criminal Responsibility: A person is considered criminally responsible if the result would not have occurred without their conduct. This means that the person's actions, whether acting alone or concurrently with another cause, must have contributed to the occurrence of the result. However, if another cause is clearly sufficient to produce the result, and the person's conduct is clearly insufficient, they may not be held responsible.

Difference in Result: Regardless of the actual outcome, a person can still be held criminally responsible for causing a result if the only difference between what actually happened and what the person desired, contemplated, or risked is either a different offense being committed or a different person or property being affected. This means that even if the exact intended or anticipated result did not occur, the person can still be held responsible for their actions and the consequences that transpired.

Sec. 6.04 of the Texas law ensures that individuals can be held accountable for their conduct and the results that stem from it. It establishes the principle of causation, emphasizing that if a person's actions contribute to a result and there are no clear intervening causes, they can be held criminally responsible. Additionally, the law recognizes that slight variations in the outcome should not exempt someone from responsibility if the underlying conduct and risk were present.

This summary provides an overview of Sec. 6.04, clarifying the principles of causation and criminal responsibility for conduct and its results in the context of Texas law.

Sec. 6.04. CAUSATION: CONDUCT AND RESULTS. (a) A person is criminally responsible if the result would not have occurred but for his conduct, operating either alone or concurrently with another cause, unless the concurrent cause was clearly sufficient to produce the result and the conduct of the actor clearly insufficient. (b) A person is nevertheless criminally responsible for causing a result if the only difference between what actually occurred and what he desired, contemplated, or risked is that: (1) a different offense was committed; or (2) a different person or property was injured, harmed, or otherwise affected. Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.